











Title of Thesis: TWO STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: THE 
CONVERGENCE OF COLD WAR 
POLITICS, LABOR, AND ETHNIC 
TENSIONS IN THE JULY 1946 STRIKES 
AT KIRKUK AND ABADAN 
 
  
 Tiffany Claire Hobson, Master of Arts, 
2019 
  
Thesis Directed By: Professor Peter Wien, History 
 
 
This thesis explores the convergence of Cold War politics, labor issues, 
and ethnic conflict on the local scale during the labor strikes which 
occurred in July 1946 at the oil refineries in Kirkuk, Iraq and Abadan, Iran. 
The roles of the local communist parties in leading the strikes are weighed 
against the workers’ economic concerns to determine that the workers’ 
motivations for striking extended beyond political support for any particular 
party, and claims that the violence which ended the strikes was the result 
of inherent ethnic conflicts are debunked through examination of both 












TWO STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: THE CONVERGENCE OF COLD 
WAR POLITICS, LABOR, AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN THE JULY 1946 













Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 












Professor Peter Wien, Chair 
Assistant Professor Shay Hazkani 


























© Copyright by 
























Table of Contents 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... II 
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 
OUTLINE AND ORGANIZATION ....................................................................................5 
SUMMARY OF EVENTS ...............................................................................................8 
CHAPTER 1: THE COLD WAR, COMMUNISM, AND THE ROLES OF THE 
IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE TUDEH PARTY IN THE 1946 STRIKES
................................................................................................................................ 13 
HISTORY OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY AND TUDEH PARTY ............................... 16 
IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY AND TUDEH ROLES IN LEADING THE STRIKES.................. 18 
SOVIET INFLUENCE AND THE AZERBAIJANI CRISIS ................................................... 19 
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE STRIKES ................................ 23 
BRITISH AND AMERICAN RESPONSES ...................................................................... 25 
IRAQI AND IRANIAN RESPONSES .............................................................................. 27 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER 2: LABOR UNIONS IN KIRKUK AND ABADAN AND LABOR 
ISSUES AS MOTIVATION FOR THE STRIKES .................................................. 30 
PRESENCE OF LABOR UNIONS IN KIRKUK AND ABADAN .......................................... 30 
WAGES, BENEFITS, AND SERVICES AT THE IPC AND AIOC ...................................... 34 
DEMANDS IN THE JULY 1946 STRIKES ..................................................................... 38 
GLOBAL REACTIONS AND OUTCOMES ..................................................................... 41 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 43 
CHAPTER 3: ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND THE ERUPTION OF VIOLENCE ........ 44 
DISSOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE GENESIS OF THE BRITISH 
MANDATE IN IRAQ .................................................................................................... 45 
BRITAIN IN IRAN ....................................................................................................... 46 
ETHNICITY AND THE 1946 STRIKE IN IRAQ ............................................................... 51 
ETHNICITY AND THE 1946 STRIKE IN IRAN ................................................................ 56 
REJECTING THE PERSIAN-ARAB DICHOTOMY IN IRAN .............................................. 58 




CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 62 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................... 66 
RECORDS AT THE U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, 
COLLEGE PARK, MD ............................................................................................... 66 









































Upon applying to the University of Maryland’s history graduate 
program, I wrote in my statement of purpose that I intended to study the 
modern Middle East in order to better understand the region’s position in 
the world today. Before graduate school, my only education about the 
Middle East came from the news, the political opinions of family, friends, 
and neighbors, and brief units on the Fertile Crescent and Persian Empire 
in tenth-grade world history. Coming from a conservative state, all my life I 
heard that the Middle East was full of people who hated the United States 
and wanted to see the country collapse. I knew this couldn’t be the whole 
story and wanted to learn everything I could about what the Middle East is 
really like, why it is so important to contemporary international politics, and 
how it came to be that way. 
It turns out that one of the most important lessons that I learned in 
the last four years is that the study of history is valuable for more reasons 
than simply gleaning knowledge from the past to understand the present. 
Regardless, in my study of twentieth-century Iran and Iraq, the influence of 
decades-old conflicts, alliances, and political marginalization of both 
majority and minority groups on current events continues to rear its head 
in surprising and meaningful ways. In particular, Iran’s oil nationalization 
crisis and the 1958 Iraqi Revolution proved foundational in the trajectories 
of their respective countries, and the reverberations from these events are 
still felt in the Middle East today. This callback to my original intent upon 
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entering the program encouraged me to look back at a relatively minor 
event and to explore its major themes through the eyes of a group whose 
perspective had been previously ignored. 
In the late nineteenth century, Great Britain established political 
control in Iraq and Iran. This control was sometimes direct and other times 
indirect, but altogether it was relatively short-lived. By the 1940s, both Iraq 
and Iran had gained independence from British governmental control, but 
the prevalence of British economic ventures and close relations between 
British officials and the ruling powers in both countries ensured that Britain 
maintained its influence. The oil industries, in particular, were dominated 
by British companies, and resentment over an oil concession which 
heavily favored British enterprise and netted Iran only a small portion of 
the profits from its own natural resources led Iranian Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mosaddegh to nationalize Iran’s oil industry in 1951. Iraq’s 
relationship with Great Britain was quite different; the country was 
originally established as a British mandate by the League of Nations in 
1921 and gained its independence in 1932, but the Anglo-Iraqi treaty that 
granted Iraq independence also contained provisions which continued to 
grant Great Britain significant economic and military power in Iraq. 
In response to the Iranian oil nationalization crisis, in 1953 the 
American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), British Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS), the Iranian Shah, and Iranian General Fazlollah Zahedi 
planned and executed a coup to unseat Mosaddegh. In 1958, Iraq’s 
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Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in the July 14 Revolution, 
establishing the Iraqi Republic. Both of these events proved critical in 
determining the paths of each country’s history and the history of the 
Middle East as a whole in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Mosaddegh’s fall allowed the Shah to consolidate and regain much of his 
lost power through a series of reforms that became known as the White 
Revolution, facilitating the rise of an autocratic rule which inspired the 
1979 Islamic Revolution. The revolution in Iraq marked the beginning of an 
era of Iraqi independence from colonial influence as well as a profound 
victory for pan-Arabism, a movement which was gaining traction and 
support widely across the Middle East. 
Many complex factors contributed to oil nationalization and the 
1953 coup in Iran and the Iraqi Revolution, but the same themes are 
strikingly present in seemingly small, insignificant earlier events as well. 
Two of these themes are Britain and America’s fear of the spread of 
Soviet communist ideology and growing calls for self-determination across 
the Middle East, often based on ethnic or national identity. At the end of 
World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union vied for power 
across the globe, and much of the United States’ foreign policy, as well as 
the policies of its allies, was guided by a fear of communism spreading 
across Asia and Europe, culminating in the spread of the Soviet state into 
formerly independent states. Concerns that Mosaddegh would not prove a 
strong enough leader to prevent Soviet advances into Iran combined with 
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the British desire to regain its oil concessions spurred the CIA and the SIS 
to conspire in the 1953 coup, and Britain’s interest in maintaining its 
influence in Iraq shared similar motivations. Both Iraqis and Iranians, on 
the other hand, became increasingly frustrated with continued British 
involvement in their countries’ politics and with unfair economic 
agreements. Mosaddegh nationalized the oil industry because Iranians 
were tired of seeing the profits from Iran’s natural resources go to another 
country, and Britain’s continued military presence and close relationship 
with Hashemite rulers were unacceptable to Iraqis who sought to 
completely expel Britain along with the Hashemite monarchy in the 1958 
Revolution. 
Similar themes are present in the subject of this thesis, the July 
1946 labor strikes at the oil refineries of Kirkuk and Abadan, which are 
widely agreed to be precursors to the anti-British actions of oil 
nationalization in Iran and the Iraqi Revolution. In the aftermath of the 
strikes, the American and British governments scrambled to understand 
why and how the strikes occurred and who was responsible for their 
bloody endings. The strikes were led by the communist parties of Iraq and 
Iran, but the United States’ and Britain’s fear of communism spreading in 
the Middle East led investigating officials to place disproportionate 
emphasis on the role of the parties and to misinterpret communist goals in 
leading the strikes. When pressed to uncover the cause of the Abadan 
strike’s violent ending, in particular, ethnic tensions became the 
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scapegoat, perhaps in response to growing pan-Arabism which threatened 
Britain’s position across the Middle East. 
 
Outline and Organization 
 
This thesis takes a microhistorical approach to explore the 
prominence of Cold War tensions and the rise of communism along with 
the complex relationship between ethnic identity and political affiliation in 
the 1946 strikes in Kirkuk and Abadan with the intention to analyze the 
events from the point of view of the workers, a point of view which has 
mostly been ignored thus far. I use internal correspondence from the 
United States Department of State to critically asses the workers’ 
motivations for striking, including communist influence and tensions 
between ethnic groups as well as genuine labor concerns. Ultimately, I 
find that while the role of the communist parties in planning the strikes was 
hugely important, the workers participating in the strikes took action on 
more personal economic motivations— the workers were not paid enough 
and did not have adequate housing and transportation for themselves and 
their families. Additionally, despite British insistence that the Abadan 
strike’s bloody ending was caused by bad blood between ethnic groups in 
the city, I argue that the truth is more complex and that class conflict 
played a larger role than ethnicity. 
The first chapter focuses on the role of the Iraqi Communist Party 
and the Tudeh Party in organizing the strikes and galvanizing the workers. 
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The Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party had risen to prominence in 
the years leading up to the strike and were quickly growing and gaining 
support across both countries. Without leadership from the parties, it is 
likely that the strikes may never have occurred, but there also is little 
evidence to support claims by United States and British officials that 
furthering a communist agenda was the primary goal of the strikes. 
Furthermore, British and American fears that a communist success in Iraq 
or Iran could lead to a Soviet takeover in either country demonstrates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between local 
communist groups in the Middle East and the broader Soviet communist 
agenda. In this chapter I challenge the explanation most widely accepted, 
both contemporarily and by historians, that the strikes were politically 
motivated to strengthen the Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party and 
to weaken the oil companies, arguing instead that while the roles of the 
Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party were paramount in the strikes’ 
organization, the workers themselves had no political agenda. 
The second chapter builds on the first and offers an alternative 
explanation for why the oil refinery workers participated in the strikes. 
Unskilled laborers of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) lived in poverty because their wages did not 
provide a decent living, and both companies dragged their feet to address 
housing shortage issues and a lack of public transportation in both Kirkuk 
and Abadan. Raising wages, constructing more housing, and providing 
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transportation were the three primary demands in both strikes, suggesting 
that the workers did not participate in the strike because they wanted to 
further an agenda in line with Iraqi, Iranian, or Soviet communist ideology 
but because they had genuine labor concerns. 
The final chapter closely examines the role of ethnic conflict in 
motivating the strikes and the bloody clash between the workers and the 
Arab Union in Abadan which ended the strike. In the State Department 
sources, it is clear that officials from the AIOC aggressively pushed the 
claim that friction between Arabs and Persians in Abadan led to the riot 
which resulted in the murders of several prominent Arab contractors and 
merchants, distancing the company from the violence. In this chapter, I 
turn a critical eye on the use of ethnicity to define opposition groups and 
offer class conflict as a possible alternate explanation. 
The events discussed throughout the thesis occurred within a 
fourteen day period, so there is little existing scholarship about the strikes 
beyond superficial analysis to support an author’s larger argument. Due to 
the lack of scholarship and the narrowness of the topic in question, there 
is no single account which summarizes the key events and chronology of 
the strikes. The following section is intended to fill this gap and to ensure 
that all readers can begin each chapter with a firm understanding of how 





Summary of Events 
 
By 1946, the Iraq Petroleum Company was the largest oil company 
in Iraq, and the same was true of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran, 
each employing thousands of skilled and unskilled laborers. The IPC 
established an oil refinery in Kirkuk, a city in northeast Iraq in what was 
the Mosul province at the time, which became operational in 1932, and the 
AIOC completed construction on a refinery on Abadan Island in the 
northern tip of the Persian Gulf and the Khuzestan Province in 1912. 
Working under conditions they deemed unsuitable, laborers at the oil 
refinery in Kirkuk submitted a list of demands to the IPC in mid-June 1946, 
threatening to strike if the company did not acquiesce to the demands by a 
July 1 deadline. The company failed to respond, and on July 4 the workers 
went on strike, demanding that the IPC: 
• increase the basic minimum wage 
• construct living quarters for workers 
• cease unjustified firings by some company officials 
• introduce social insurance 
• compensate workers injured in the course of performing 
their jobs 
• provide transportation for workers who live far from their 
job sites 




• and provide oil for fuel and allowances for travel between 
the refinery and workers’ home when they are on leave1. 
A delegation met with the Mutaserrif2 twice during the strike to negotiate 
but failed to move beyond a stalemate. The workers refused to end the 
strike before the company ceded to the demands, and the company 
refused to cede until the workers ended the strike. Throughout the 
duration of the strike, the workers, who lived in the city of Kirkuk but 
worked at the refinery several kilometers away, met daily at Gawur-Baghi, 
a garden outside the city, to discuss the progress of negotiations. 
These meetings were always attended by approximately a dozen 
mounted policemen who monitored the situation, but on July 12, over 100 
policemen arrived at the meeting armed with rifles and a car-mounted 
machine gun and surrounded the workers. The Assistant Commandant of 
the police force ordered the workers to disperse but could not be heard by 
the crowd, which numbered several hundred. The workers continued the 
meeting, and the Assistant Commandant ordered the police to open fire 
on the crowd. As the workers fled the scene, the police chased them 
                                                      
1 Report by Musa Shaikh Radhi to Political Committee of Al-Ittihad Al Watani (National 
Union) Party, July 17, 1946, enclosed in Dispatch No. 1342 from James S. Moose, Jr. to 
The Secretary of State, July 23, 1946; Folder 850.4; Volume 17; Box 108; Iraq; U.S. 
Embassy & Legation, Baghdad; General Records; Records of the Foreign Service Posts 
of the Department of State, NAID 1717953, Record Group 84; National Archives at 
College Park, College Park, MD.  
 
Telegram No. 402 from James S. Moose, Jr. to the Secretary of State, July 14, 1946; 
Folder 850.4; Volume 17; Box 108; Iraq; U.S. Embassy & Legation, Baghdad; General 
Records; Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NAID 
1717953, Record Group 84; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
2 The Mutaserrif was similar to a city mayor and acted as a liaison between residents of 
Kirkuk and the IPC. 
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down, pursuing some even as far as the town. Altogether, between 10 and 
18 workers were killed and several dozen wounded. The workers had 
gathered peacefully and were unarmed, and no policemen were injured in 
the fray. 
The next day the workers continued to strike, marching from a café 
in the center of the city to the police headquarters, demanding that those 
responsible for the previous day’s carnage be brought to trial and that the 
families of those slain be compensated for their losses. The procession 
then continued to the local Iraq Army headquarters before returning to the 
starting point. The police, meanwhile, had arrested the leaders of the 
strike. The workers continued to negotiate, and the company, fearing 
further conflict in response to the police force’s violence, agreed to 
increase the workers’ wages so that the living allowance and 
accommodation fees would equal a minimum of 310 fils3 per day. On July 
16, the strike ended, and on July 20 the IPC announced that the basic 
minimum wage would be increased by 60 fils and housing allowances 
would be increased by 50 fils4. No further demands were met. 
Meanwhile, a similar conflict erupted in Abadan. On May 18, 1946, 
the Iranian government implemented a labor law which the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company failed to fully observe, citing confusion over provisions 
                                                      
3 I was unable to find information tracking the value of the Iraqi Dinar beyond 1960. 
However, according to fxtop.com, 310 fils in 1960 equaled about 7.50 US dollars today. 
The 60 and 50 fil increases would have equaled approximately $1.50 and $1.20 today. 
4 CICI Review No. 275 for Period Ending July 18, 1946; Folder 800; Box 21; Confidential 
File Iraq; U.S. Embassy & Legation, Baghdad; Classified General Records; Records of 
the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, NAID 1717955, Record Group 84; 
National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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regarding the required minimum wage and whether the company must pay 
workers for Friday, their day off, for their lack of compliance. In June, the 
Tudeh-led Workers’ and Toilers’ Union in Abadan approached the 
company with complaints that the labor law was not being observed, but 
the company refused to take any immediate action, arguing instead that 
the Iranian government must clarify the relevant provisions and promising 
that the AIOC would defer to its decision. Unsatisfied with the company’s 
lack of action, the Workers’ Union demanded that a satisfactory answer to 
the question of Friday pay must be given by July 5, or else they would 
take drastic action. The AIOC persuaded the union to extend the deadline 
to July 13 but doubled down on its stance of deferment to the Iranian 
government. Meanwhile, the government began to prepare a ruling and 
issued announcements stating that any strikes declared by the union 
would be considered illegal. However, despite orders on the contrary from 
the union’s central committee in Tehran, the union leaders in Abadan 
called a general strike on July 14. 
The day of the strike passed peacefully until violence erupted 
between the Workers’ Union and the Arab League,5 a recently formed pro-
British and anti-Tudeh organization of Arab merchants and AIOC 
contractors at least partially supported by the AIOC, on the evening of the 
14th. The Arab League planned to celebrate the grand opening of its 
headquarters the following day, so only a few of its leaders were in town 
                                                      
5 Also called the Democratic Tribal Union and the Democratic Arab Union. 
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on the day of the strike. The striking workers had gathered in the city of 
Abadan for speeches, and the crowd, angry that the League had planned 
to celebrate its grand opening on nearly the same day as the strike, made 
its way to the Arab League headquarters.  It is not clear which faction 
attacked first, but both parties’ claims of total innocence ring false; though 
only one union landed the first blow, both contributed to escalating the 
situation until the tension exploded into violence. By the time the Iranian 
army had regained control of the city, around 50 people died and 150 
were wounded. Among the dead were most of the Arab Union’s leaders: 
Haji Haddad and his secretary, Syed Mohd Qudsi, Aziz, Sheikh Zorab 
Baghlani’s son, and Sheikh Zorab’s brother. The police arrested the 
leaders of the Workers Union. 
On July 15, a commission led by Prince Firouz, representative of 
the Prime Minister, arrived in Abadan to negotiate a settlement. The 
commission ordered the AIOC to raise the minimum wage to 35 Rials6 per 
day and to pay workers the same amount for Fridays. The AIOC agreed to 
the wage increase but refused to pay workers their wages for the 14th and 
15th. Firouz also ordered the release of the union leaders on bail on the 
condition that the strike end by the beginning of the 2 pm shift on the 16th. 
The union agreed to the terms set by the commission, and on July 16th 
the strike was ended and workers returned to the refinery. 
                                                      
6 In 1960, 35 Rials equaled around $3.40 in today’s United States dollar according to the 
fx.com currency exchange and inflation calculators. 
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Chapter 1: The Cold War, Communism, and the Roles 




As the Second World War drew to a close in 1945, the world looked 
hopefully toward a new era of peace characterized by regrowth, renewal, 
and repair. What it found instead was the birth of a new conflict, rooted in 
ideology, fueled by fear, and fought through a series of proxy wars. The 
United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the war as global 
superpowers, vying for ideological control and dividing the rest of the 
world into three spheres of influence: the American sphere, the Soviet 
sphere, and the yet-unconquered Third World. Though the beginning of 
the Cold War is generally agreed to coincide with the introduction of the 
United States’ Truman Doctrine in 1947, in 1946 unofficial lines had 
already been drawn in the sand, with both the United States and the 
Soviet Union looking towards the Middle East for its vast oil reserves.  
Long before the start of World War II, Britain had already 
established control of the Iraqi and Iranian oil industries. In 1901, Qajar 
Shah Mozzafar al-Din and British oil mogul William Knox D’Arcy signed a 
concession granting D’Arcy the sole rights to prospect for oil in Iran (then 
Persia). D’Arcy discovered oil reserves large enough to support 
commercial enterprise in 1908, and in 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company (APOC), renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935, took 
over the concession and built a refinery at Abadan, which was the largest 
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in the world at the time. In 1912, the British navy began modernizing its 
ships, vastly increasing its demand for oil, and in 1913 the British 
government obtained a controlling interest in the APOC when it signed an 
agreement to advance £2,000,000 to the struggling company with the 
promise that the money must eventually be paid back and could be 
converted into shares in the company at any time7. Thus, Britain firmly 
established a vested interest in the Iranian oil industry and no small 
measure of control of the AIOC. 
A portion of the D’Arcy concession included a southern border 
territory which was transferred to Turkey from Iran in 1913 and then to 
Iraq. When the territory passed to Iraq, the Iraqi government agreed to 
honor the D’Arcy agreement, granting a new concession in 1925. Also, in 
1925, the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which was renamed the 
Iraq Petroleum Company in 1929 and of which the APOC owned 47.5 
percent, was granted a concession covering the entirety of Mosul and 
Baghdad. In 1927, the TPC struck oil in Kirkuk and began drilling wells. In 
1928, the TPC reorganized to include United States oil companies. Under 
the new arrangement, the APOC and a group of U.S. oil companies 
conglomerated under the name Near East Development Corporation and 
each received 23.75 percent of the shares with the remaining shares 
going to Dutch and French companies and British-Armenian businessman 
                                                      
7 R.W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 1, The Developing 
Years, 1901 – 1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 158 – 201. 
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Calouste Gulbenkian8. Although the British government had no real 
control in the TPC beyond being a shareholder of one of its shareholders, 
the TPC concession combined with Britain’s position as the administrator 
of the Iraqi mandate, a position Hopwood calls a “flimsy veil” for British 
domination9, allowed the government to establish a firm degree of control 
of the oil industry in Kirkuk and maintain a close relationship with the oil 
company’s administrators. 
As the Cold War heated up, control over oil proved a major concern 
for Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Britain needed a 
steady source of oil to update its navy, and oil was paramount to any 
number of Soviet and American industries necessary to maintain world 
dominance. The United States and Britain carefully monitored the strength 
and proliferation of communism in Iraq and Iran, and the influence of Cold 
War tensions on international politics is demonstrated through their 
preoccupation with the role of the local communist parties in the 1946 
strikes. An understanding of Cold War politics and diplomacy helps 
explain the British, American, Iraqi, and Iranian governments’ concerns 
surrounding communist involvement in the strikes, but it also helps one 
look beyond their preoccupation with potential Soviet involvement to 
examine other important influences. Government officials from each 
                                                      
8 R.W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, The Anglo-Iranian 
Years, 1928 – 1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 152 – 162. 
9 Derek Hopwood, “Social Structures and the New State 1921 – 1958,” in Iraq: Power 
and Society, ed. Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow, and Thomas Koszinowski (Reading, UK: 
Ithaca Press, 1993), 8. 
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country were quick to point to the furtherance of the Soviet agenda as the 
true cause of the strikes in an attempt to discredit the strikers, and even 
historians have largely agreed that strengthening the communist parties in 
Iraq and Iran was the primary goal of the strikes, but closer analysis 
reveals a more nuanced tale. Although the Iraqi Communist Party and 
Tudeh Party organized and led the strikes, political goals informed by 
communist ideology cannot account alone for the workers’ motivation to 
strike. 
 
History of the Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party 
 
Although Britain and the United States held more influence than the 
Soviet Union in Iran and Iraq when the strikes at Abadan and Kirkuk 
occurred, communist parties had already been established in each country 
several years prior. The Iraqi Communist Party was established in 1934, 
and in 1941 Iran’s communists came together to create the Tudeh Party. 
The Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party dominated leftist politics in 
their respective countries in the early years of their existence, and by 1946 
both parties had established strong networks and linked themselves with 
unions in key fields, including the railroads and oil industry, and perhaps 
most importantly, were still operating legally10. The Iraqi Communist Party 
                                                      
10 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), 301-302. 
 
Ilario Salucci, A People’s History of Iraq (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2003), 20. 
 
 17 
was particularly successful despite its small size; between 1944 and 1946, 
twelve of the sixteen labor unions legalized in Iraq were run by the party11. 
Similarly, by 1945, the Tudeh Party had thirty-three affiliate trade unions 
with membership that totaled seventy-five percent of the industrial 
workforce12 
The July 1946 strikes were the largest Tudeh and Iraqi Communist 
Party-led strikes thus far, but both parties enjoyed prior success as well. In 
May 1946, the Tudeh Party’s Central Council of Federated Trade Unions 
orchestrated a general strike in the oil industry which led to the Iranian 
government passing the first comprehensive labor law in the Middle East. 
The labor law: 
“promised the eight-hour work day; Friday pay; six day’s 
annual holidays, including May Day; worker’s insurance and 
unemployment pay; minimum wages based on local food 
prices; outlawing of child labor; and the right of workers to 
organize independent unions13.”  
The labor law failed to address all provisions clearly, allowing the AIOC to 
shift blame and responsibility for addressing the workers’ demands to the 
Iranian government in the subsequent July strike, but the Tudeh Party’s 
success gave leverage to organize the much larger strike just months 
later. The Iraqi Communist Party led a series of smaller strikes in early 
                                                      
11 Salucci, People’s History of Iraq, 20. 
12 Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 109. 
13 Ibid, 110. 
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1946 as well, focusing on the issues of working conditions and wages14. 
Although these strikes were small and saw limited success, they gave the 
Iraqi Communist Party credibility among workers and helped set the stage 
for labor action in July. 
 
Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Roles in Leading the Strikes 
 
It was no secret that the strikes in Kirkuk and Abadan were led and 
organized by Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party members. Although 
no evidence exists to suggest that Tudeh Party leadership directed the 
Abadan strike, the leader of the Workers’ and Toilers’ Union in Abadan, 
Nejafi, had been a member of the Tudeh Party for nearly a year before the 
strike,15 and the earlier May strike had, in fact, been directly organized by 
the Tudeh Party16. Once the strike began, the Tudeh Party also distributed 
pamphlets in support of the workers in Abadan However, in Kirkuk, the 
Iraqi Communist Party played a far more direct role, releasing a manifesto 
outlining the party’s grievances with the Iraq Petroleum Company and a 
list of demands.  
The Workers’ and Toilers’ Union and the Iraqi Communist Party 
released a very similar set of demands. Both wanted to see an increase in 
                                                      
14 Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 113. 
15 Memorandum of Conversation with Nejafi, Union Boss, Appendix 4 to Dispatch No. 3 
from the American Embassy, Tehran to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1946; Folder 
850.4; Box 24; Confidential File Iraq; U.S. Embassy & Legation, Baghdad; Classified 
General Records;  Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 
NAID 1717955, Record Group 84; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
16 Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian 
Relations (New York: The New Press, 2013), 19. 
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minimum wages, company-provided transportation to the refinery work 
sites from the cities of Kirkuk and Abadan, and increased housing 
allowances or the construction of company-provided housing. The similar 
demands and overlapping timing of the strikes led some to speculate that 
the strikes were planned in conjunction, but there is no evidence to 
suggest this is true17. A Tudeh pamphlet distributed in Abadan justified the 
strike without taking responsibility, arguing that that the AIOC used state 
property and Iranian labor to turn a profit without being held adequately 
accountable18. Iraqi Communist Party publications employed a similar 
argument, and the party’s daily meetings during the strike kept the 
workers focused on their goals. 
 
Soviet Influence and the Azerbaijani Crisis 
 
Any communist victory or display of strength was troubling to the 
United States and the United Kingdom, but they found the Abadan 
Workers’ Union’s ability to mobilize thousands of workers and successful 
negotiation for the most important of their demands particularly troubling in 
light of the growing crisis in Azerbaijan. The United Kingdom and the 
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Soviet Union strategically invaded Azerbaijan in 1941 to create a barrier 
against German expansion in the Middle East as well as to maintain a line 
of communication and supply chain between the Allied Powers during 
World War II. Since neither country had formally colonized Iran, the 
invasion was promised to be temporary; all British, American, and Soviet 
troops would be removed from Iran within six months of the end of the 
war. The United States and the United Kingdom withdrew their troops by 
the March 1946 deadline, but the Soviet Union refused. In the meantime, it 
had also established two pro-Soviet republics in Azerbaijan, which seized 
control of the territory and established independent governments19.  
Already alarmed by the apparent influence wielded by the Soviet 
Union in Iran, British administrators were quick to attempt to discredit the 
Workers’ Union and the strike. Colonel Underwood, AIOC security officer, 
argued that the union’s reasons for striking were not economic, but rather 
political. In addition to referring to the workers’ demands as “frivolous,” 
Underwood claimed “the whole strike and subsequent actions of Muzafer 
Firouz savoured strongly of a political plot engineered by the pro-Russian 
Tudeh Party20.” Colonel Willoughby, British Consul at Khorramshahr, 
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blamed the Soviets for the strike, arguing that it was a direct attack on the 
AIOC21. Nejafi, however, denied that the Soviets had any influence on the 
strike, pointing to the Workers’ and Toilers’ Union central committee as the 
source of direction for the Abadan branch of the party22. Although the 
Azerbaijani crisis had little to do with labor issues in southern Iran, it 
appears likely that the strong reactions against the strike by British and 
American Foreign Service officials were informed by a fear that the Soviet 
Union had successfully made an attempt to expand its influence further 
south. 
However, this fear of Soviet influence in the strikes demonstrates 
American and British ignorance of how significantly the communist parties 
in Iraq and Iran diverged from globally-oriented Soviet policy. Communist 
parties across the Middle East tended to break from Soviet ideologies of 
anti-fascism and labor rights, instead concentrating their efforts on anti-
colonial endeavors in European-occupied, or otherwise dominated, Middle 
Eastern states. From its inception to the mid-40s, the Iraqi Communist 
Party grew steadily, but it was still small and had little support among the 
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working class and even less among rural peasants. The party was also 
plagued by factional splits, personal conflicts among leadership, and 
uncommitted membership, and as a result the party did not have a clear 
ideology or direction until 1944 when Fahd, one of the party’s founders, 
consolidated his leadership of the party and introduced an ideological 
agenda primarily focused on achieving democracy and independence in 
Iraq rather than communist goals in line with the global Soviet agenda23. 
The Tudeh Party initially fell into line with the Soviets, naming labor reform 
and elimination of the class structure system in Iran as their primary 
causes, but the party suffered from this association with the Soviet Union 
during the 1946 Azerbaijani crisis, which threatened Iranian sovereignty, 
and distanced itself from the Soviet line, moving towards nationalism 
instead24. A strike motivated by specifically Iranian or Iraqi communist 
ideals as they existed in 1946 would have intended to weaken the 
positions of the IPC or the AIOC in Iraq and Iran, but the purely economic 
demands of the July strikes show no evidence for these motivations. 
Beinin and Lockman invert the argument that striking workers across the 
Middle East made demands for economic gains with the purpose of 
furthering nationalist movements, arguing instead that nationalist 
movements were strengthened by workers demanding economic gains 
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from foreign-run companies and providing practical pollical rallying-points 
for anti-colonial agendas25. 
 
The Historiography of Soviet Influence in the Strikes 
 
The U.S. State Department was not able to uncover any evidence 
tying the Soviet Union to the strike, and even the British officials most 
convinced of Soviet involvement failed to produce real proof. Colonel 
Underwood wrote in a report to a company official called the general 
manager that strike orders must have been made to the Tudeh Party from 
Russia because the strike was timed to occur the day before the Arab 
Union’s headquarters officially opened, meaning that the league was not 
yet at full strength, and because the workers seized important Arab Union 
records— decisions which he claimed were too clever to have originated 
from Iranians26. In addition to displaying appalling bigotry, this argument 
was the greatest, and most wholly unconvincing, evidence of Soviet 
involvement Underwood could muster. However, historians agree overall 
that the strike posed a victory for communism. Abrahamian27 and Elwell-
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Sutton28 point to the Iranian government’s support of the workers as a 
particularly helpful in securing the union’s victory, and Marlowe comments 
that the strike’s success was particularly meaningful to communists in the 
wake of the Azerbaijani independence movements29. 
However, although the Soviet Union played no role in the Kirkuk 
strike, the Iraqi Communist Party was still an important force in the region. 
Without the party’s presence in Kirkuk, a general strike would likely not 
have been successful, or may not have even occurred. Salucci notes that 
between thirty and sixty percent of the oil workforce in Iraq was unionized, 
suggesting that securing support for a strike would not be a problem, but 
also points out that all major union leaders were also members of and 
supported by the Iraqi Communist Party30. Perhaps the union could have 
organized successfully without the support of a leftist party, but Longrigg 
attributes the success solely to the influence of outside factors, namely, 
the Iraqi Communist Party31. Bet-Schlimon takes a less extreme, but 
similar, stance, arguing that the party’s presence in Kirkuk made the city 
“fertile ground for labor organization” and pointing to the blurred lines 
between foreign entities and local power structures as further 
complications in untangling the relationship between workers, the Iraqi 
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Petroleum Company, and the state32. Tripp further claims that the Iraqi 
Communist Party successfully led strikes in multiple industries because of 
its ability to integrate with and appeal to workers33.  
 
British and American Responses 
 
However, although the success of the strikes worried United States 
and British diplomats and company officials, the volume of State 
Department correspondence regarding the Azerbaijani crisis compared to 
the volume of correspondence regarding both strikes demonstrates that of 
the two, destabilization in Iran due to Azerbaijani independence was the 
more pressing matter. Unsurprisingly, the sovereignty of Iran and its 
position within the United States’ sphere of influence mattered far more 
than the AIOC’s profit margins. 
Although the Soviet Union likely had nothing to do with the strike in 
Abadan, Britain’s paranoia very nearly played beautifully into Soviet 
interests. Worried that the strike was just the first step in a larger 
campaign orchestrated by the Soviet Union34, the British Navy anchored 
the HMS Norfolk, a heavy cruiser, in Iraqi waters just 4 miles from 
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Abadan, ready to invade should the violence resume or escalate35. Had 
British troops entered Iran, the Soviet Union certainly would have seized 
the opportunity to reoccupy Azerbaijan and perhaps even move further 
south under the auspices of defending Iran against British imperialism. 
William G. Burdett Jr., the American vice consul in Basra, criticized the 
move, stating that in its zeal to protect its oil interests, Britain had lost the 
moral high ground it previously held over the Soviet Union36. In the Cold 
War’s conflict of ideology, a perceived moral high ground was often the 
only advantage the British and Americans had and not something they 
could afford to lose. 
Though the British and Americans shared concerns about the 
Tudeh influence on the strike at the Abadan refinery, in Kirkuk their 
analysis diverged. The United Kingdom still occupied Iraq, and as a result, 
the Soviet Union had little influence or interest in Kirkuk. The United 
States was deeply concerned about the level of violence Kirkuk police 
displayed in subduing the unarmed workers, and much of the 
correspondence between the Kirkuk Consul, American Embassy in 
Baghdad, and the Secretary of State reported on the findings of 
                                                      
35 Report by Colonel Underwood, AIOC Security Officer, July 19, 1946, Appendix 1 to 
Dispatch 103 from the American Embassy, Tehran to The Ambassador, July 24, 1946; 
Folder 850.4; Box 24; Confidential File Iraq; U.S. Embassy & Legation, Baghdad; 
Classified General Records;  Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of 
State, NAID 1717955, Record Group 84; National Archives at College Park, College 
Park, MD. 
36 Development of the Labor Unions, the Tudeh Party, and the Arab League in the 
Abadan Area, Dispatch No. 48 from William C. Burdett, Jr., August 13, 1946; Folder 
850.4; Box 24; Confidential File Iraq; U.S. Embassy & Legation, Baghdad; Classified 
General Records;  Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 
NAID 1717955, Record Group 84; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
 
 27 
investigations into the event37. All reports, with the exception of a review 
by the Combined Intelligence Center Iraq, found that the police attacked 
the crowd unprovoked, and several documents point to the unwarranted 
violence as a trend in the Umari government. Since the Soviet Union’s 
influence in Iraq was negligible and public backlash to the brutal police 
actions could have easily further destabilized Mosul, United States officials 
seemed to not worry about the Iraqi Communist Party’s success. 
However, Britain had more to lose, and as in Abadan, attempted to 
discredit the workers by pointing to party involvement as evidence that the 
strike’s intentions were purely political38. 
 
 
Iraqi and Iranian Responses 
 
The Iraqi government responded to the strikes in a similar vein as 
the British, claiming that the strikers’ motives were political rather than 
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economic. The government, particularly the Kirkuk police force, received 
the brunt of the criticism and vitriol that emerged after the violent clash 
with the strikers. James S. Moose Jr., the American Charge D'Affaire in 
Baghdad, wrote to the Secretary of State that he observed three general 
trends across the country in reaction to the actions of the police. Leftist 
parties wholly denounced the government and defended the right of the 
workers to strike, nationalist and anti-government newspapers criticized 
the government for its drastic action but did not defend the strikers, and 
pro-government newspapers barely mentioned the affair at all39.  
In the face of a storm of opposition, the Umari government 
attempted to censor its most vocal critics, even to the point of arresting 
and prosecuting Kamal Beg Al-Chadirohi, chairman of the National 
Democratic Party and director of its newspaper Sawt Al-Ahad, for 
publishing three articles condemning the Kirkuk police force’s actions in 
firing upon peacefully protesting demonstrators40. Communism was an 
easy scapegoat, but Umari’s attempts to shift the blame were ultimately 
unprovable and ineffective. The Iranian government’s response to the 
strikes, on the other hand, was more favorable to workers. Prime Minister 
Qavam sent Prince Firouz, a known Tudeh sympathizer to negotiate the 
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terms of the settlement between the company and the workers, essentially 
ensuring that the workers would receive some concessions and that the 




Ultimately, the roles of the Iraqi Communist Party and the Tudeh 
Party were paramount in organizing the July 1946 strikes in Kirkuk and 
Abadan. The parties were responsible for planning the strikes and for 
drumming support through the distribution of pamphlets and by holding 
meetings to incite the workers to action. However, even by 1946 much of 
American foreign policy stemmed from a fear of communism and the 
spread of the Soviet Union. Because the U.S. State Department, British 
Foreign Service, Iraq Petroleum Company, and Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company— or in other words, American and British powers— placed such 
an emphasis on the role of the communist parties and potential Soviet role 
in the strikes in their initial reports, it is easy to fall into the trap of believing 
that the parties’ involvement was the only crucial factor in the workers’ 
decision to strike. When the United States’ and Britain’s fear is factored in, 
however, it is clear that a more measured analysis must be made. 
Although the Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party undoubtedly played 
vastly important roles in the strikes, the unity of the workers as a labor, not 
political, organization and the seeming disunity between ethnic groups 
deserve further attention. 
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Chapter 2: Labor Unions in Kirkuk and Abadan and 




When oil refinery workers at Kirkuk and Abadan went on strike in 
1946, contemporary critics pointed to a communist political agenda as 
their primary motivation, and most historians have also largely 
emphasized the role of Tudeh and Iraqi Communist Party leaders in 
organizing the strikes. However, this emphasis on political leaders and 
party motives ignores the voices of the largest body of people involved in 
the strikes– the workers themselves. The leaders of the strikes most likely 
were politically motivated, hoping to increase support for their respective 
parties among the working class, but the evidence points to more personal 
motivations on behalf of the strikers. The oil workers who participated in 
the strikes had genuine concerns about wages, living conditions, and 
company compliance with existing labor laws and demanded the Iraq 
Petroleum Company and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company take action to 
address their concerns– demands which ultimately proved successful. 
Without physical acts of support from the workers, the strike would never 
have succeeded, and it is imperative that their motivations be credited 
equally to the motivations of their communist leaders. 
 
Presence of Labor Unions in Kirkuk and Abadan 
 
It certainly is no surprise that any communist party would easily 
gain support among the working classes in Iraq and Iran who watched a 
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foreign entity sweep into their country, harvest their natural resources, 
then keep the majority of the profits for itself while failing to pay workers a 
living wage. Rooted in European intellectualism, communism was 
popularized by Marx and Engels, whose introduction of the theory of class 
struggle in The Communist Manifesto in 1848 inspired the Bolsheviks to 
establish a regime in 1917 which claimed to represent the interests of the 
proletariat and to be committed to international communist revolutions. 
Marx and Engels theorized that all European societies followed the same 
progression from the primitive communism of man’s earliest days to slave 
societies, then to feudalism and capitalism. Eventually, they claimed, 
workers would become conscious of social classes and their own poor 
standing in the social order and rebel against capitalism, establishing 
socialist states that eventually would give way to communism41. Although 
this theory of history was more difficult and problematic to apply to states 
outside of Europe, Marx and Engels’ claim that the working classes would 
inevitably rise against exploitation by the state appealed to the frustrated 
oil refinery workers at Kirkuk and Abadan. 
Isakhan, Mako, and Dawood describe the Iraqi Communist Party’s 
presence in Kirkuk as “fertile ground for labor organization,” but it is 
equally true that the large force of unskilled laborers made Kirkuk and 
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Abadan ideal locations to target new membership for communist parties42. 
In an airgram dated July 9 to the Secretary of State, George Allen, the 
U.S. Ambassador to Iran, estimates that 35,000 workers in Abadan were 
“nominal” members of the Tudeh Party43, a figure which is corroborated by 
Abrahamian, who estimates that in the whole of Iran, seventy-five percent 
of the industrial labor force was unionized by 1945, including 45,000 oil 
workers, who were primarily located in Abadan44. Similarly, Salucci 
estimates that thirty to sixty percent of the oil workforce in Iraq was 
unionized, though Iraqi Community Party membership only numbered 
around 4000 nationwide45. Even before plans for the July 1946 strikes 
began to take shape, Kirkuk and Abadan workers were demonstrating a 
strong interest in labor organization despite lukewarm political interest in 
communism. 
Although the labor unions and communist parties of each country 
were separate entities, they were closely associated with each other due 
to the labor unions’ leadership coming nearly exclusively from the 
communist parties. This close association also affected the legal status of 
the labor unions, which often were only legal when the communist parties 
were able to operate legally. In Iraq, where the Iraqi Communist Party 
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operated legally in 1946, workers were permitted to form unions.  The 
Tudeh Party operated legally as well in 1946, and in fact held a number of 
seats in the Majles during Qavam’s fourth term as Prime Minister from 
1946 to 1947, and unions flourished during this period as well46.  
Membership in the union and membership in the local communist 
party were not necessarily a one-to-one correlation, but they were closely 
related enough that knowing the strength of one can give a general sense 
of the strength of the other. By the virtue of their pro-labor ideology alone, 
the communist parties already were in a position to gain significant 
support among Iraq and Iran’s working classes, but the parties were 
further assisted by the IPC and AIOC’s labor policies. The companies paid 
their workers bare subsistence wages, driving their employees into the 
arms of any party willing to represent the interests of laborers. Even if 
communism had no hold in either city, the combination of a politically 
active workforce and low wages made the Kirkuk and Abadan oil refineries 
ripe for unrest. 
However, communism and the growing strength of local communist 
parties cannot completely account for workers’ motivations to participate in 
the strikes. As previously mentioned, approximately 45,000 oil workers in 
Iran were unionized and 35,000 workers in Abadan were at least 
marginally affiliated with the Tudeh Party, but altogether, between 65,000 
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and 70,000 workers participated in the strike47. Similarly, the Iraqi 
Communist Party’s total membership numbered about 4000 across all of 
Iraq, but 5000 workers in Kirkuk alone joined the strike48. Participation 
statistics indicate that not all strikers in either city were particularly 
interested in communism or in furthering a communist agenda. A lack of 
sources documenting ordinary workers’ concerns make it difficult to know 
exactly why they may have gone on strike in 1946, but analysis of working 
conditions and demands presented in the strike clearly indicates that labor 
issues played a larger role in galvanizing workers than communism.  
 
Wages, Benefits, and Services at the IPC and AIOC 
 
That workers at the Kirkuk and Abadan refineries were underpaid 
was not disputed. Both the Iraqi and Iranian governments attempted to 
address the wage issue by passing labor laws earlier in the year but were 
either unable or unwilling to enforce the new laws. In Iran, the passage of 
the labor law was forced by the Tudeh Party when it led a successful 
strike in the oil industry on May 1. The 1946 labor law is referred to widely 
by historians and United States State Department records alike in the 
context of the July strikes, but details of the law’s requirements beyond the 
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basic issues addressed are frustratingly absent. In a defense of the AIOC, 
Colonel Underwood hints at two of the provisions of the 1946 labor law 
when he names two points the AIOC lacked a clear understanding of– 
what the new minimum wage was in Abadan and how Friday pay should 
be administered– suggesting the law required the company to pay workers 
for their Fridays off and set a new minimum wage with the additional 
requirement that regional adjustments be made for the local cost of living, 
but it failed to specify how much the adjustment should be49. Reports on 
the Iraqi labor law were even vaguer, but it’s likely that the Iraqi law also 
attempted to set a new minimum wage. In a report to the Embassy in 
Tehran and other American posts in the region, United States Vice Consul 
to Basra William G. Burdett, Jr. comments on the need for a higher 
minimum wage in Abadan, noting that AIOC workers were paid at a bare 
subsistence level. He further argues that the issue was exacerbated by 
the AIOC’s total monopoly on goods and services in the region, meaning 
that local bazaars could not thrive and workers could not acquire the 
goods for their basic needs from anyone else for a lower price50. Historian 
Hanna Batatu notes a similar problem in Iraq and argues that as the 
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decades passed, Iraqi workers became worse off as wages failed to keep 
up with the rapidly increasing cost of living51. Salucci estimates that 
between 1939 and 1948, food prices increased by eight times in Iraq, but 
wages only increased by four52. As reluctant as the IPC and AIOC may 
have been to raise the minimum wage, it clearly was an issue that could 
no longer be ignored. 
In addition to poor wages, IPC and AIOC workers faced housing 
issues as well. American Legation to Baghdad attache William J. Handley 
reports that although the closest distance between the refinery and the city 
of Kirkuk was only about 1.2 kilometers, less than a mile, most workers 
lived in an area of Kirkuk that required a 5 kilometer, or 3 mile, journey to 
work, and the IPC refused to provide transportation, claiming it was the 
city’s responsibility to provide public transportation53. Handley also reports 
that the lack of housing in Kirkuk was further exacerbated by the 
destruction of 700 houses in the previous winter’s heavy rains54. A report 
prepared by the State Department’s Division of International Labor, Social 
and Health Affairs similarly reports that during World War II the AIOC grew 
rapidly and could not keep up with the increasing demand for housing due 
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to a lack of building materials, resulting in a severe shortage of adequate 
housing for the company’s employees55. 
However, although the IPC and AIOC did not exactly champ at the 
bit to raise wages or improve the housing issues, they also did not 
completely ignore their workers’ needs. About a month before the strike 
began in Abadan, AIOC works manager W.K. Ross began to hold 
biweekly meetings between three AIOC representatives and three union 
representatives to address complaints and issues raised by the union56. 
Additionally, both the IPC and the AIOC provided a wide range of services 
and benefits for their employees, including healthcare. However, Longrigg 
notes that the services met a lukewarm reception at best; the services 
offered were not ones that the workers actually wanted or needed57. On 
the other hand, Sutton reports that in Kirkuk, the scale of services offered 
by the company failed to meet the worker’s needs. For example, the 
company employed only thirty-five doctors, not nearly enough to 
adequately care for its employees’ health needs58. Regardless of the 
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Abadan workers’ supposed apathetic reactions to the services offered by 
the AIOC, Longrigg argues that the AIOC was a better employer than 
other companies in Iran, discontent was the exception rather than the rule, 
and the strikes only occurred as a result of outside influence59. However, 
the lack of communist party membership or affiliation among striking 
workers simply does not support Longrigg’s emphasis on the role of 
outside factors. Labor issues clearly played a more dominant role than 
historians have usually agreed. 
 
Demands in the July 1946 Strikes 
 
Despite claims by Longrigg and more contemporary critics of the 
strikes, if one judges by the demands made of the IPC and AIOC alone, 
the strikes appear to have been primarily motivated by frustrations related 
to labor issues. Even the AIOC works manager Ross reported that 
negotiations between workers and the company leading up to the strikes 
were based purely on economic grounds60. Reports on the exact demands 
of the striking laborers vary, but overall the demands primarily focused on 
changes to workers’ wages and quality of life and to services offered by 
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the IPC and AIOC. The strikers in both Kirkuk and Abadan demanded 
increases in their wages and the provision of transportation for the large 
portions of workers who lived far from their work sites, and in Kirkuk they 
also demanded the company either construct housing for workers or 
provide them with housing allowances61. Abadan workers further 
demanded that the company grant Friday pay62. F. Lester Sutton, 
Secretary of the United States Embassy in Tehran, reported to 
Ambassador Allen that the workers in Abadan also requested the removal 
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of a particular garage foreman for unspecified reasons63. In the same 
document, Sutton claimed that the strike was purely politically motivated.  
As previously discussed, evidence of the motivations of the leaders 
behind the strikes is scarce, making it difficult to conclude whether 
Sutton’s claim is legitimate, but it certainly is possible that the Iraqi 
Communist Party and Tudeh Party saw growing labor issues in Kirkuk and 
Abadan as opportunities to be exploited to demonstrate their strength or to 
increase party membership. The Tudeh Party, in particular, may have 
been emboldened by Soviet success in Azerbaijan. However, it is unlikely 
that the majority of laborers who participated in the strikes were motivated 
by anything other than a desire for better wages and living conditions. 
Ambassador Allen’s description of Abadan workers as “nominal” members 
of the Tudeh Party suggests that most were not deeply committed to the 
party or its political ideology, and most workers in Kirkuk were only 
members of the union, not of the Iraqi Communist Party. The voices of the 
workers were not recorded, but their presence and participation in strikes 
with demands for labor policy change speak volumes. Without the 
momentum created by workers fighting for labor rights, any political 
motives the Iraqi Communist Party and Tudeh Party may have harbored 
would likely have gained little support. 
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Global Reactions and Outcomes 
 
Reactions to the strikes by the United States, Britain, Iraq, and Iran 
varied from vicious opposition to sympathy, though the workers received 
little outright support from entities other than the Iraqi Communist Party 
and Tudeh Party. The United States was monitoring the situation closely 
but also refused to become involved, perhaps because it would not take 
the same financial hit that Britain would take if the workers were 
successful. Though no State Department official formally endorsed or 
condemned the strikes, the tones of reports back to the Secretary of State 
often revealed sympathy for the workers64. British reactions were, 
unsurprisingly, almost wholly negative, both from the oil companies and 
from representatives of the state, though the Tudeh’s success in Abadan 
led one unnamed British official at the Ministry of Fuel to remark that the 
party may well prove to be the future party of the working class65. The 
IPC’s Acting Field Superintendent, Mr. Green, also expressed empathy for 
the workers and placed some blame on the company, calling the lack of 
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housing and transportation a “rotten situation” and remarking, “we were 
not caught with our pants down but holding them up with our fingers 
crossed66.” Iraqi public opinion, on the other hand, firmly supported the 
workers, though condemnation of the police force’s brutal actions 
outweighed actual support for the labor issues raised by the workers67. In 
Iran, the AIOC was enraged at Prince Firouz’s generous ruling in favor of 
the strikers and leniency in the punishment of the strike’s leaders68. 
Ultimately, however, the only reactions that really mattered were those of 
the central governments in Baghdad and Tehran, and despite any fear of 
or personal distaste for the communist parties, both governments granted 
important concessions to the workers. Though they did not receive every 
demand made at the beginning of the strikes, employees of the Kirkuk and 
Abadan refineries received significant wage increases and living 
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When studying any labor, social, or political movement in history, it 
is important to always keep in mind the agency of all the people involved 
in the movement, not just the leadership. When the agency and 
motivations of the July 1946 strikers in Kirkuk and Abadan are taken into 
account, it becomes clear that the workers did not participate in the strikes 
to further a communist agenda, but rather to stand up for themselves and 
to demand better wages, working conditions, and a better quality of life. 
This focus on the actual workers is also important when considering the 
causes behind both strikes’ violent endings. The British foreign service 
officers and company officials responding to the deadly clashes quickly 
















The United States Department of State officials, British Foreign 
Services officials, and spokesmen for the Iraqi Petroleum Company and 
Anglo-Iran Oil Company primarily focused on the role of the communist 
parties in reports about the 1946 strikes, but State Department documents 
reveal an interesting emphasis on ethnicity and ethnic conflicts as well, 
particularly in Iran. The sources do not place a great emphasis on ethnicity 
in Iraq, perhaps because the Mosul region’s heterogeneous nature did not 
lend itself well to a narrative pitting ethnicities against each other. 
However, the State Department spent many resources attempting to 
understand the relationship between the Arab Union and the Workers and 
Toilers Union in Abadan, the reason for and causes of violence between 
the two groups, and the relationship between the Arab Union and the 
AIOC. These sources at times explicitly posit that the violence which 
ended the strike in Abadan was fueled entirely by ethnic tensions. This 
perspective, however, vastly oversimplifies the problem, which had less to 







Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the Genesis of the British 
Mandate in Iraq 
 
Before the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the 
state of Iraq did not exist, and the three provinces69 that now make up 
modern Iraq fell under Ottoman rule. When the Ottoman Empire fell, 
France and Britain negotiated a secret agreement, which was quickly 
uncovered and made public by the Soviets in 1917. The 1916 Sykes-Picot 
Agreement divided the Middle East into French and British spheres of 
influence arbitrarily assigned based on strategic and economic concerns 
rather than ethnic, religious, or cultural considerations, with Britain 
dominating in the Persian Gulf region70.  
In 1920, the Ottoman Empire began to be dismantled with the 
Treaty of Sèvres. The new Turkish state contested the Treaty, and in 1923 
the Treaty of Lausanne settled the question of Turkish authority in the 
former Ottoman territories, ceding Mosul to Iraq71. Britain’s presence and 
influence in Iraq were reinforced by the decision of the League of Nations 
to grant Britain a twenty-year mandate in the region, a decision which 
Abdullah claims was “nothing but a cover for colonialism” and was met 
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with revolt in across Iraq72. Though the revolt failed, Yaphe argues that it 
“played an important role in the creation of an Iraqi national mythology and 
in shaping future British policy in Iraq73.” Upon the insistence of Woodrow 
Wilson that nations within the former Ottoman Empire experience some 
degree of autonomy, the Treaty of Sèvres also included a provision 
allowing for the creation of a Kurdish state in the Mosul region74. However, 
this provision was never enforced, a failure that Sluglett attributes to 
Britain’s lack of a “moral purpose” in implementing the Iraqi mandate 
which resulted in any policies contrary to British economic goals to be 
undermined or cast aside75. Britain annexed most of the oil-rich region 
which would have been the independent state of Kurdistan into Iraq, a 
move which fostered resentment among the Kurds of Mosul, especially 
when compounded by discrimination in the oil industry. 
 
Britain in Iran 
 
British influence in twentieth century Iran looked very different than 
in Iraq, largely due to the fact that Britain was never granted power over 
the entire country by a larger governing power as the League of Nations 
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had established the British mandate in Iraq. In the nineteenth century, 
Russia defeated Qajar Persia in two wars, establishing a strong degree of 
influence through the adoption of treaties which were unfavorable to the 
Qajar regime. Russian influence in Persia worried Britain, and fueled by 
the further desire to have access to the Persian Gulf, Great Britain began 
establishing connections in Persia through commercial enterprise, such as 
telegraph and mineral-exploration concessions76. British influence in Iran 
began in earnest with military conquests leading to the adoption of the 
1857 Treaty of Paris, which established independence for the British-allied 
city of Herat.  
The introduction of British influence in Persia established a new 
status-quo for Persian politics, which tiptoed carefully around Russia and 
Britain, pitting them against each other in a delicate dance to maintain 
some degree of independence– a dance which lasted long beyond the fall 
of the Qajar dynasty and the creation of Iran under a constitutional 
monarchy ruled by Reza Pahlavi in 190677. Meanwhile, at the same time 
that the Persian government worked to maintain the balance of power 
between Britain and Russia, the Constitutional Revolution’s successful 
establishment of a Constituent Assembly in 1906 introduced yet another 
source of political tension between the Shah and the many parties that 
sprang up around the democratically elected assembly78.  
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Well before the July 1946 strike at the Abadan refinery, Britain set a 
precedent for stirring up trouble among ethnic and tribal groups to achieve 
their own ends. In 1912, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later renamed 
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, took advantage of the Bakhtiyari drive to 
dominate newly formed Iran and signed a treaty with the tribe, obtaining 
promises of protection in areas controlled by the Bakhtiyari79. When the 
Qashqai in Shiraz damaged British trade through the imposition of illegal 
taxes, violating agreements between the Iranian government and British 
companies, Britain goaded the Bakhtiyari into conflict with the Qashqai. 
Ironically, this move ensured the Qashqai would refuse to side with Britain 
and the United States in the 1953 coup to depose Prime Minister 
Mosaddegh. The British continued to maintain relations with the Bakhtiyari 
and as the oil nationalization crisis swelled, employed them to revolt 
against the central government in order to weaken and discredit 
Mosaddegh. Even early in its tenure as a dominant power in Iran, Britain 
saw opportunities to leverage existing disunion for its own benefit, a 
strategy which the AIOC effectively employed to influence political events, 
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The Mosul Question and League of Nations Investigation 
 
Although reports to the State Department did not emphasize 
ethnicity to any large degree when assessing the political motivations and 
outcomes in the Kirkuk strike, the question of whether ethnicity determines 
political stance became relevant in Iraq well before 1946. As the former 
Ottoman Empire was being divided under the Treaty of Sèvres, the 
League of Nations faced a dilemma: should the ethnically diverse Mosul 
province be given to Turkey or the newly-formed state of Iraq? Determined 
to make a judgment based on what the majority of the community wanted, 
the League conducted an investigation to learn what Mosul residents 
preferred. Dodge and Shields argue this decision was the result of 
Woodrow Wilson’s liberal vision for a restructured world based on self-
determination after World War I80. Fully expecting opinions to be divided 
along ethnic lines, the League was surprised to learn that the answer was 
not nearly so simple.  
First, as Anderson and 
Stansfield illustrate with their 
chart (Figure 1) contrasting 
Turkish, British, and Iraqi 
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Figure 1: Population of the Mosul Vilayet 
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survey results, a lack of consistent methodology and definitions for what it 
means to be Kurdish, Arabic, or Turkic led to wildly differing and unreliable 
results81. Furthermore, the investigation found that decades of 
intermarriage and coexistence had blurred ethnic lines to the point that 
most people’s ethnic identity was fluid and had no meaningful impact on 
their political views82. As Bet-Schlimon eloquently states, “…the political 
interests of the people of Kirkuk were primarily determined by their ties to 
one or more of three patrons: the British administrators of Mandate Iraq, 
the fledgling Iraqi central government, or Turkey83.”  
However, even if no strong correlation existed between ethnic 
identity and political stances, the League of Nation’s emphasis on 
protecting the rights of minorities leading up to Iraqi independence in 1932 
continuously brought identity politics to the forefront of Iraqi politics, 
causing communities which previously did not identify as separate ethnic 
groups to begin defining themselves through the lens of ethnic identity84. 
Pan-Arabism was also becoming increasingly popular in the Middle East 
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at large during this time, not least as a form of resistance against 
European colonialism, and Iraq was no exception.  
Ultimately, the commission to determine Mosul's fate ruled that the 
province should become a part of Iraq, but it also required Iraq to remain 
under mandate for twenty-five years and to permit the Kurds in Mosul to 
exercise some non-specific degree of autonomy85. Though rising Kurdish 
nationalism throughout the 1920s and 1930s likely contributed to the 
success of opposition groups to the Iraqi government, primarily the Iraqi 
Communist Party, as Tripp suggests86, if the League of Nations’ findings 
about the fluidity of identity among Mosul residents were accurate, twenty-
five years surely is not long enough to cement formerly ambiguous 
identities, which begs the question: how much did ethnicity and ethnic 
conflict actually contribute to the 1946 strike in Kirkuk? 
 
Ethnicity and the 1946 Strike in Iraq 
 
Unsurprisingly, it turns out that the relationship between ethnic 
conflict and labor movements in Iraq is quite complicated. Historians 
readily agree that tension between ethnic groups or between ethnic 
groups and the government already existed, but it is also clear that the 
discovery of oil in Mosul and segregation among the Iraqi Petroleum 
Company’s workers further exacerbated preexisting issues. However, 
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analysis of primary sources equally clearly indicates that while ethnicity 
colored some underlying tones of the strike, ultimately it came about as 
the result of genuine labor concerns that transcended politics of race and 
ethnicity. 
The Iraq Petroleum Company was founded in 1912 under its 
original name, the Turkish Petroleum Company, but it was not until oil was 
struck in Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk that the oil industry began to take off in 
1927. Eager to take advantage of the discovery, the Iraqi government 
tightened its grip on Mosul. The Kurdish autonomy promised by the Treaty 
of Sèvres never came to be, and to add insult to injury, the Turkish 
Petroleum Company began Arabizing Mosul, hiring Arabs and Assyrians 
from other parts of Iraq rather than local Kurds. Anderson argues that the 
influx of workers significantly changed the social order as new, better 
neighborhoods were built to accommodate the better-paid Arabs and 
Assyrians, which lead to marginalization of the Kurds and increasing 
violence between Kurds and the Iraqi government and made Kurdish 
laborers easy targets for recruitment by the Iraqi Communist Party87. 
Similarly, Bet-Shlimon argues that the IPC primarily worked toward 
its own corporate and imperial interests and perpetuated social 
segregation in the city along ethnic lines88. Although Iraq was not a colony 
and the IPC, despite being owned in part by the British government, was 
not a colonial power, the company perpetuated British colonial rule in 
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respect to ethnic minorities, reserving the better jobs, housing, goods, and 
services for workers of certain ethnicities, a trend which Fuccaro says the 
workers noticed and became increasingly more angry and frustrated 
with89. Segregation was determined by the ethnic identities Britain had 
defined during the League of Nations’ investigation into Mosul, and these 
definitions were largely arbitrary as most people could fall in any number 
of ethnic categories90.  
Social segregation, in fact, was the major issue on the subject of 
Arab nationalism that divided Iraq’s communists from other political 
groups. Pan-Arabism was a popular movement in the early twentieth 
century in Iraq, even garnering support from communists, but communists 
differed from most Pan-Arabists by emphasizing a more local approach 
rather than calling for one large, united Arab nation91. Vitalis argues that 
the closeness between communism in Middle Eastern states, ethnicity, 
and anti-colonialism contribute to a larger trend across the region of oil 
companies downplaying wages and benefits as causes for labor unrest, 
pointing instead to nationalism and xenophobia among the workers as 
sources for conflict92. Investing in oil put these firms at greater risk for 
nationalization in the increasingly anti-colonial climate of the Middle East, 
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so the companies projected their own xenophobia onto the workers in an 
attempt to divert attention from labor issues that could be exploited by 
communists to push back against colonial enterprises such as European 
oil companies. 
This issue of social segregation calls into question the origin of 
ethnic conflicts in relation to labor and of the origin of ethnic identity in Iraq 
in general. Division in the labor force along ethnic lines was not organic, 
but rather resulted from racial bias among IPC officials, and the Iraqi 
Communist Party was quite clearly more concerned about economic 
inequality than ethnic inequality in their demands for reform in the strike. 
Haddad’s Sectarianism in Iraq calls scholars to examine identity, 
partisanship, and sectarianism through a broader lens than merely race, 
ethnicity, religion, or even class, arguing that British influence in Iraq 
imposed many of these categories on Iraqis, obfuscating the modes of 
identity which were in reality far more subtle and complex93.  When the 
causes and motives of the 1946 Kirkuk labor strike are examined through 
this lens, it is clear that while ethnic discrimination certainly correlates with 
the workers’ complaints, economic distress was a stronger motivation. The 
workers who participated in the strikes came from roughly the same class 
and social standing; the fact that social classes in Kirkuk were sharply 
divided along ethnic lines can be traced back to discrimination by 
company officials rather than any inherent racial or ethnic conflicts. 
                                                      




Indeed, historians largely agree that ethnic identity was not a 
divisive factor in the strike. Abdulla claims that two conflicting tribes set 
aside their differences for the strike, but provides no additional details, 
calling into question the legitimacy of that claim, especially considering no 
other historians mention this alliance. In a survey of Iraqi social classes, 
however, Batatu writes that social classes in Iraq could not be defined 
alone by ethnicity, religion, politics, or economic standing, but rather they 
were defined by a complicated combination of all of these factors94. He 
also agrees with the findings of the League of Nations commission; 
ethnicity was not an important factor in determining a person's political 
leanings. He notes that several of the founding members of the Iraqi 
Communist Party were of mixed racial ancestry, but so were ten out of the 
twenty-three Iraqi Prime Ministers during the period of the monarchy, 
suggesting that race and ethnicity were of little consequence in Iraqi 
political struggles95. Correspondence from the United States’ Department 
of State suggests that Batatu was likely correct. When discussing the 
strike, the Americans and British never refer to the specific ethnicity of the 
workers, and the lack of ethnicity-specific demands presented by the 
workers suggests that labor issues were altogether the most important 
and influential cause of the 1946 strike. Tensions between the workers 
and the company were on the rise as far back as 1931 when the IPC laid 
off over 1000 native Iraqi workers to decrease their oil output and exercise 
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greater control on the market96. If any previous ethnic conflict contributed 
to the strike, it was likely to have been pushed to the tipping point by 
ethnic segregation in the IPC. 
 
Ethnicity and the 1946 Strike in Iran  
 
The role of ethnicity in the Iran strike, however, was even more 
complex and more prominent than in Iraq. The United States and Iran 
clearly viewed the strike as a clash between the (largely Persian) workers 
and the anti-Tudeh Arab League, which rushed to the defense of the 
AIOC, primarily to push back against the communists leading the strike. 
Elm argues that the AIOC was shocked when the strike broke out and 
encouraged Arab workers to form a labor organization to counter the 
strike, a claim which some United States officials also made in reports 
back to the secretary of state97. In reality, with British support, the Arab 
League began to form before the strike officially began, suggesting its 
foundation was a preemptive decision and not merely reactive. In 
response to the strike in Abadan, the British also moved much more 
forcefully against the workers than in Kirkuk, replacing troops in Basra with 
more elite units from India and sponsoring an anti-Tudeh Bakhtiari and 
Qashqai revolt against the central government98, illustrating once again a 
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willingness to manipulate ethnic groups already at odds with the status 
quo into acting in the interests of Britain.  
The workers in Abadan also declared the strike out of similar 
frustration due to discrimination of Iranian workers. By the late 1940s, the 
AIOC was the largest foreign investor in Iran, but it had no Iranian workers 
in high-level positions99. However, before rushing to point at ethnic conflict 
between Arabs and Persians as a major cause behind the strike’s violent 
end, it is important to consider the class differences between the strikers 
and the Arab League’s founding members. The strike’s participants were 
largely unskilled Persian workers who had migrated to Khuzistan from 
other parts of Iran, but the Arab League was comprised of landed 
merchants and AIOC contractors of a higher social status and deep local 
roots. This social divide greatly complicates the relationship between the 
workers and the League. The tensions which eventually led to the strikes 
violent end cannot be boiled down simply to Arabs versus Persians but 
must also take into account the conflicts between the settled population 
and migrant workers, economic concerns that a strike may have incurred 
among contract laborers and local merchants, and anti-communist 
sentiment among land-owners who would be adversely affected by a 
Tudeh rise to power. 
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Rejecting the Persian-Arab Dichotomy in Iran 
 
The issue of ethnic conflict in the 1946 strike in Abadan is generally 
framed as a dichotomy: Persians versus Arabs. However, Atabaki and 
Elling push back against this claim, pointing to the involvement of Indian 
workers in the strike as evidence that the issue, as is almost always true, 
was much more complex. When the AIOC originally began operations, it 
initially hired local tribesmen to work in the oil refinery, but later imported 
workers from India, Iraq, other parts of Iran, Palestine and Europe, 
resulting in only 40% of the workforce being local to Khuzestan. Indian 
labor migration came in two waves; in the first, Indians primarily were 
brought to Iran to work as skilled and unskilled workers, but second phase 
workers were hired for middle-ranking positions100. Atabaki found that 
Indian migrant workers comprised the majority of the skilled and semi-
skilled workforce at Abadan and were treated as second class workers 
rather than third class workers as the Persians were101. As in Kirkuk, the 
AIOC segregated its workers of differing ethnicities into a hierarchy, with 
Iranians at the bottom, then Indians, then Iranian and Armenian 
Christians102. 
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The AIOC’s social stratification of ethnic groups in Abadan led to 
further inequality in terms of quality of life. For example, because Abadan 
is located on an island in the middle of a river and could only expand so 
far, the influx of foreign workers and the AIOC’s disinterest in providing 
adequate housing unless forced led to a housing shortage which 
disproportionately affected the poorest workers, which were primarily 
Persian103. Considerable tension existed between Iranians and Indians in 
Abadan that was exacerbated, if not caused by, company-enforced 
segregation, and on a few occasions, this tension even erupted into 
violence104. However, although Indian workers were generally treated 
better than Persian workers, they had grievances as well, and in 1920 
Indian workers at the Abadan refinery led the first mass strike in Abadan, 
demanding higher wages, fewer work hours, overtime pay, better living 
conditions and treatment105. Perhaps then, it is not surprising that in 1946, 
Indian workers were able to overcome their differences with Persian 
workers, at least temporarily, and joined the strike, proudly associating 
with the labor union. Having a more direct line to company officials than 
the unskilled laborers who made up the majority of the strike, the Indian 
protestors even took their grievances directly to the British Consul106. 
Failing to acknowledge the role of Indian workers in the strikes is a 
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mistake and illustrates the pitfalls of focusing too exclusively on one ethnic 
group. The Indian workers’ contributions to the strike were significant, but 
only examining the role of Persian workers masks the Indian workers’ 
importance. 
The limitations of presenting ethnic conflict in Iran as tensions 
between Arabs and Persians also ignores the spaces Jewish workers 
occupied within the AIOC. Shenhav explores the Zionist settlement in 
Abadan’s relationship to British colonial interests in The Arab Jews: A 
Postcolonial Reading of Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity and finds that 
even people of a shared ethnic group experienced life in Abadan very 
differently depending on their country of origin. The AIOC gave European 
Jews better jobs, higher pay, and company-sponsored housing, but Arab 
Jews were treated similarly to Persian workers107. Whether Jewish 
workers participated in the 1946 strike is not discussed in the State 
Department correspondence, perhaps because acknowledging the 
participation of Arab Jews would undermine the assertion that the violence 
was ethnic in nature or perhaps because the Jewish workers simply did 
not participate. However, Shenhav’s findings demonstrate yet again, the 
weakness of a narrative which upholds ethnicity and race as the foremost 
causes of violence in Abadan.  
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Haddad’s warning that sectarianism cannot be adequately 
understood through the lens of ethnicity rings especially true when 
examining the July 1946 strikes in Kirkuk and Abadan. Ethnic lines 
dividing the oil refinery workers in both cities were not organically drawn 
but imposed by the IPC and AIOC through discriminatory hiring practices 
and wage and benefits distribution. Taking this discrimination into account 
reveals again that the strikes were influenced by labor and economic 
issues above all else; Kurds, Persians, and Indians did not strike because 
they were being treated badly as ethnic groups but because they were 

















The struggle between communism and democracy dominated 
global politics and international relations from the end of World War II to 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 to such a degree that any event 
involving communism or communists was viewed with the utmost 
suspicion by anti-communist regimes. The Iraqi Communist Party's and 
Tudeh Party’s involvement with the labor strikes at Kirkuk and Abadan in 
July 1946 are perfect examples of how this played out, even at local 
levels. The United States, Great Britain, the oil companies, the 
governments of Iraq and Iran, and even historians have largely attributed 
the cause of the strikes to a desire to strengthen the communist parties in 
Iraq and Iran and to weaken British control in each country.  
American, British, and scholarly convictions that communism was 
the greatest influence on the strikes can probably be explained by the 
previous successes the Iraqi Communist Party and the Tudeh Party had 
enjoyed earlier in 1946. During the Azerbaijan Crisis in early 1946, 
communists in northern Iran helped establish two pro-Soviet republics, 
and both the Tudeh Party and Iraqi Communist Party organized strikes 
that led to the passage of labor laws in Iraq and Iran. However, in spite of 
the United States’ and Britain’s concerns about the communist influence 
on the strikes, they ultimately proved to be relatively minor events that did 
not cause any great changes in the region. 
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Although it certainly is true that the leaders of the strikes were 
members of the local communist parties and undoubtedly became 
involved in labor issues to drum up support for their parties, placing too 
much emphasis on the strikes’ leadership ignores some of the most key 
players- the workers themselves. Although the Iraqi Communist Party and 
the Tudeh Party were growing rapidly in the early 1940s and found 
significant support among the workers at the oil refineries in Kirkuk and 
Abadan, the number of participants in the strikes far outshone the 
membership rosters of the communist parties in each city. Furthermore, 
the demands made in the strikes revealed only everyday concerns about 
wages, housing, and transportation. These were the issues that the 
workers showed up for, not a grand communist agenda. 
The refineries at Kirkuk and Abadan grew quickly during World War 
II to keep up with demand for oil, but the IPC and AIOC could not keep up 
with housing demands for their rapidly growing labor force. This explosive 
growth resulted in a severe shortage of adequate housing for low-level 
laborers, especially in Kirkuk where winter floods had destroyed 
thousands of houses in the previous year. The workers felt that IPC and 
AIOC should be responsible for either building housing for their employees 
or for paying housing allowances to help the workers afford housing from 
other sources and demanded that the companies provide at least one of 
these. The housing that did exist for workers was located several 
kilometers from the refineries, so even when workers were lucky enough 
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to have a house, they had to walk a far distance to work because there 
was no mode of transportation provided by the city or the companies. This 
inspired the workers’ second major demand that the IPC and AIOC use 
company vehicles to provide transportation for workers from the cities to 
the refineries. Finally, the workers demanded an increase in pay because 
during the war they saw their wages stagnate while the cost of living 
continued to soar. 
The challenges faced by the laborers at Kirkuk and Abadan were 
so great, that even some company officials were sympathetic to their 
plights. American officials from the State Department expressed sympathy 
for the workers, as did the Iraqi and Iranian public, but the most surprising 
expression of support came from an IPC official who confessed the 
company failed to take necessary action to care for its workers. Even 
despite the overwhelmingly negative response to communist leadership, 
the workers themselves were a sympathetic lot, and in both Kirkuk and 
Abadan were able to see some demands met, achieving great success. 
However, although both strikes proved to be successful, they 
ended quite tragically with violent clashes that led to dozens of deaths. 
The Kirkuk strike was ended with an act of police brutality, but the ending 
of the Abadan strike introduces a new component to the mix. The striking 
workers rioted and attacked a local pro-British and anti-Tudeh political 
organization, the Arab League, killing most of its leaders and sparking 
riots that took several hours to control and resulted in several dozen 
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deaths. The British Foreign Service and AIOC were quick to point to ethnic 
conflicts as the cause of the attack, claiming that the Persian workers 
attacked the Arab League’s headquarters because they felt threatened by 
the organization. This explanation does not ring true, however, because 
many ethnic divisions in the city had been created by the company itself 
through discriminatory employment practices and because the class 
differences between the workers and members of the Arab League were 
much more salient reasons to attack. 
The 1940s and 1950s were eventful years in Iraqi and Iranian 
history, and the in the grand scheme, the July 1946 strikes were relatively 
insignificant events. The strikers won concessions on the most important 
of their demands, but labor issues continued to plague unskilled and low-
level workers across both countries in all industries. The value in studying 
these events does not come from understanding how they fit into the 
grand arch of history but instead from empathizing with the ordinary 
people involved in them. The Kirkuk and Abadan strikers did not care 
about contributing to a global ideological war or about conforming to false 
dichotomies of ethnic identity; they cared about providing for their families, 
being able to work and live in dignity, and about having a place to call 
home. If we can learn to empathize with the regular people whose stories 
often get pushed aside to focus on major players and the bigger picture, 
perhaps we can better learn to empathize with the small people in big, 
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